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What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a 
member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? Plausibly some of these questions 
make sense while others stretch the limits of sense-making.  In addressing questions of how I 
might have been genetic essentialism is popular, but I argue that genetic essentialism, and other 
versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. I then consider the prospects for 
counterpart theory, and show how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts 
of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, 
being gay, or Deaf, or Black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then 
extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who  denies 
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Consider the following two scenarios: First we discover that ugliness in later life can be 
prevented by taking vitamin Z early in pregnancy. Given that being ugly is a disadvantage, 
those of us who were born ugly prior to the discovery feel a certain amount of regret. If only 
scientists had discovered the power of vitamin Z earlier, we think, we could have been better 
looking.  
 
In the second scenario, scientists discover that it is possible to turn human embryos into white 
rhinos via genetic intervention. Given that rhinos are rare, while humans are common, the 
benefits of this procedure for boosting rhino numbers are clear. An expectant mother starts to 
wonder whether she should volunteer for the procedure. She asks whether her baby would 
have a better life as a rhino, and, she gets stuck. Some of her problems are due to a lack of 
empirical data; she’s not sure whether rhinos generally have good lives. But many of the 
problems run deeper. Does the procedure for turning human embryos into rhino embryos 
result in an individual who might have been human being a rhino? Or, does it destroy an 
individual who would otherwise have become a human being and use its genes as mere raw 
material for constructing a completely new entity? 
 
Working out when it makes sense to say that I might have been other than I am matters 
because this sets limits to the possibilities that I can sensibly regret or blame others for. For 
example, people with Huntington’s disease have a limited life expectancy. But unless it is true 
that people with Huntington’s might have not had this genetic condition, it makes no sense for 
them to regret that no intervention was used to make them healthy, nor to blame their parents 
for neglecting to utilise such “therapies”.  Similarly, modal truths place limits on what a 
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person might reasonably plan to become. For example, if, as a white woman, there is no 
possible future in which I am Black then there’s no sense in me trying to become Black.  
 
Deciding how I might have been requires a general metaphysical account. There are two main 
options: one may either believe in transworld identities or adopt counterpart theory.
1
 Those 
who believe in transworld identities think that the individuals that exist in the actual world 
also exist in other possible worlds and have different properties in some of them.
2
 Those who 
embrace counterpart theory follow David Lewis (1979) and claim that actually existing 
individuals are world-bound – that is individuals who exist in the actual world exist only in 
the actual world. In other possible worlds there are individuals very like those in the actual 
world. The possible people who are very like me in some respect are my counterparts and can 
be used as a comparison class to make sense of claims about how I might have been different. 
Thus, while those who believe in transworld identities will say that what makes it true that I 
might have had ginger hair is that there are possible worlds where I have ginger hair, the 
counterpart theorist will say that the truth-maker of the claim is that there are possible worlds 
that contain counterparts of me who possess ginger hair. 
 
                                                 
1
  Alternatively one can embrace a hybrid approach whereby one believes in transworld 
identity for some types of entity, and counterparts for other types of entity, an option 
developed by Forbes (1985), who thinks that transworld identity theory should be adopted 
for organisms but counterpart theory for artefacts. 
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  Of historical interest only, there have also been some who have claimed that individuals 
have all the properties that they actually possess in all possible worlds. This view is 
commonly attributed to Leibniz (Mackie, 2006a, p.22). 
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As Penelope Mackie has convincingly argued (2006a, 2006b), those who believe in 
transworld identities must respond to ‘Chisholm’s paradox’ (1967), and must consider 
whether there are possible worlds in which two actual individuals, say Noah and Adam, swap 
all their properties. The transworld identity theorist has two options. The first option is to 
argue that there are limits to the properties that actually existing individuals can lose because 
individuals possess necessary properties, such that the individual cannot possibly exist without 
possessing the necessary property.
3
 The second option is to accept that there are indeed 
possible worlds in which Noah and Adam have swapped all their properties, and that this 
world differs from the actual world only in that the “bare identities” of the individuals with 
Noah-ish and Adam-ish properties are different. The alternative to these options is to reject 
talk of transworld identities, and adopt counterpart theory. 
 
Running parallel to these metaphysical debates, within moral philosophy there has been much 
discussion of volitional and narrative accounts of identity. Most writers have thought that the 
debates about identity in moral philosophy should be kept separate from discussions in 
metaphysics and that at least two distinct senses of identity are in play.  For example, Appiah 
(1990) distinguishes between “metaphysical” and “ethical” identity, while De Grazia (2005 
p.264) would have us treat “numerical” versus “narrative” identity separately. One of my aims 
in this paper is to show that this is mistake and that one can draw fruitful links between the 
                                                 
3
 This will be a start. To prevent swapping between all possible pairs individuals will need to 
have essential properties that are both necessary and sufficient for their identity in all 
possible worlds. Having some necessary properties will prevent only some potential 
property swaps, because it is not enough to prevent swapping between pairs of individuals 
both of which possess the same necessary property, eg if Noah is necessarily human and so 
is Adam then this is compatible with them property-swappping. 
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debates in metaphysics and moral philosophy. I will do this via considering how links can be 
made between the volitional account of identity developed by Harry Frankfurt and the 
metaphysical debates. Debates about identity in moral and political philosophy of course go 
much beyond the work of Frankfurt,
4
 but in drawing links between his work and the 
metaphysical disputes I will at least begin making progress in showing how the debates in 
moral philosophy and metaphysics can help inform each other. Drawing such links is 
particularly important because of the prominence of arguments regarding identity that arise in 
identity politics, where individuals often claim that characteristics such as being a woman, or 
being Black, or being Deaf, can be essential to identity.  
 
Of the metaphysical positions, the most popular option in discussions about how people might 
have been is some version of genetic essentialism (which itself is a version of origin 
essentialism). As such, I will start by considering the viability of this approach. I will argue 
that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be 
rejected. I then briefly consider what other properties, apart from those connected to origin, 
might be necessary for an individual's identity across possible worlds and argue that there are 
no plausible candidates that will do much to constrain the ways that an individual might have 
been. The second section of the paper considers the prospects for counterpart theory. I will 
argue that this option is better than claiming that an individual's origin is necessary, and will 
show how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as 
proposed by Harry Frankfurt. I then extend the discussion and explore how the transworld 
                                                 
4
 For example, though there is not space in this paper, it would be interesting to also consider 
also communitarian accounts of identity as developed by, for example, Taylor (1989), 
Sandel (1982). 
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identity theorist who does not believe in individual essences but who instead believes in bare 





1.  Necessary properties for individuals 
 
Genetic essentialism has become the default position in much of philosophy (for example in 
debates about “wrongful life” in applied ethics (see Parfit 1984 ch.16, and, for discussion, 
Zohar 1991, Kahn 1991), and in arguments in the philosophy of biology about whether natural 
selection can explain the properties of individuals or only of populations (Sober 1995; Pust, 
2004, p.771)). Genetic essentialists differ in their exact claims but all trace them back to Saul 
Kripke's arguments regarding the necessity of origins.  
 
1.1 The basis of genetic essentialism – the doctrine of the necessity of origins 
 
Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1972, 1980) is in some respects a difficult book. As a direct 
transcript of Kripke's verbally given lectures, arguments tend to be gestured at rather than 
made entirely explicit. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke suggests that our commonplace 
intuitions are in accordance with the doctrine of the necessity of origins. Kripke asks whether 
the Queen could have come from different parents. He concludes that she could not. 
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How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different sperm 
and egg, be this very woman?...It seems to me that anything coming from a different 
origin would not be this object. (1980, p.113) 
 
Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that his table could not have originated in any other 
block of wood (1980, pp.113-114); the doctrine of the necessity of origins is taken to apply to 
humans and artefacts equally. Not everyone shares Kripke's basic intuition that something 
about the origins of an entity must be necessary. Some think it possible that actual objects and 
people could have been created ex nihilo by God (e.g. Lowe, 1998, p.152; Oderberg, 2007, 
p.175). In the main text, Kripke relies on the idea that the necessity of origins accords with our 
intuitions, and offers nothing to convince those whose intuitions differ from his own. 
However, in footnote 56, Kripke also claims that in a large class of cases the necessity of 
origins is susceptible of “something like a proof”. The “proof” of footnote 56 has been subject 
to much discussion; Forbes (1985, pp.138-45) and Salmon (1981) construct versions of the 
proof, Robertson (1998) demonstrates problems with them. Attempts to reconstruct a proof, 
and criticisms of attempted proofs are currently ongoing.
5
  In the absence of a satisfactory 
proof, adherents of the doctrine of the necessity of origins adopt the position because they find 
it intuitively plausible. Here I shall show that here are various ways in which the doctrine of 
the necessity of origins might be explicated. I show that whichever option is taken leads to 
difficulties. To keep things simple, I will here consider chiefly the doctrine of the necessity of 
origins as it might apply to human beings. Human beings are a case that is of central interest 
                                                 
5 See, for example,  Hawthorne and Gendler 2000, Robertson 2000, Rohrbaugh and de Rosset 
2004, Robertson and Forbes 2006, Damnjanovic 2010 
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to us. If no version of the doctrine of the necessity of origins can be made to work for human 
beings then the doctrine loses much of its interest.  
 
1.2 Possible versions of the doctrine. 
 
Possible versions of the doctrine of the necessity of origins hold that it is necessary for human 
beings to have: 
1. their actual  parents. 
2. to originate in exactly the physical matter that they actually originate in. 
3. to have the exact genetic make-up that they actually have. 
 
Or alternatively we might consider weaker versions: 
2b. to originate in roughly the physical matter that they actually originate in. 
3b. to have roughly the genetic make-up that they have.  
 
Each option will be considered in turn. 
 
1.2.1. Is it necessary for humans to have their actual parents? 
 
The idea that it may be necessary for a person to have the ‘parents’ that they actually have 
comes directly from Kripke. I shall argue that talk of ‘parents’ is so vague as to be useless, 
and that on elaboration the intuition that ‘parents’ are necessary must collapse into the view 
that something else  about origins is necessary (either the original physical matter or genetic 
make-up). The problem is that “parents” can be hard to pin down. Sperm, eggs and embryos 
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can be donated and implanted in others. Some embryos may be clones, and DNA can be 
spliced and recombined in complex ways.  Kripke held that such “recherché possibilities” 
could be ignored (1980, p.112), but this is no longer a viable option. Reproductive 
technologies have made unqualified talk of “parents” obsolete. For Kripke's purposes, the 
most plausible clarification is to say that the parents are the people who supply the genetic 
material. Intuitively it seems that I could have been implanted in a surrogate mother, or 
adopted at birth, and yet still have been the same person. If we decide that the identity of the 
genetic material is what matters, we are still left with two options. We might claim that the 
actual physical matter that makes up the genes is important, or we might think of genes in a 
more abstract sense, as information carriers, and think that the important question is whether 
the capacity of the genes to carry information remains the same. Below, in sections  1.2.2. and 
1.2.3. each will be considered in turn, and some prima facie concerns raised. Then in section 
1.3 the conclusive argument against such approaches will be discussed – neither can deal with 
the Problem of Tolerance 
 
1.2.2. Is it necessary for humans to originate in the physical matter that they actually 
originate in? 
 
Kripke claims that it is necessary for a table to be made from the actual hunk of wood that it is 
made from. Should he make an analogous claim about human beings? Is it necessary for 
humans to originate in the physical particles that actually originally constituted them? 
 
The problem of recycling means that being made of certain physical particles can be at most 
necessary, but not also sufficient, for the identity of a human being (McKay, 1986, p.297). 
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The particles that make me up existed long before my birth, and will continue to exist long 
after my death. It is possible that at some point in the future, those same particles will come 
together in some other sperm and egg and make up another person. Although having their 
origins in the same physical materials, this person will not be me. Thus sameness of matter 
could only be necessary, but not also sufficient, for identity. 
 
Furthermore, the idea that the actual matter that makes me up is necessary to my identity has 
highly counter-intuitive consequences. Sperms and eggs are made from fundamental particles, 
and in the case of human beings, most of the fundamental particles that make us up come from 
the food that we eat. Thus, if my father had eaten a different burger from the burger that he 
actually ate, the particles that made up the sperm that partially made me would have been 
different. If we interpret the doctrine of the necessity of origins as claiming that humans have 
to be made from the actual physical particles that make them up we are forced to hold the 
counterintuitive claim that menu choices determine the identity of one’s children. The basic 
problem here is that fundamental particles intuitively seem interchangeable. Given that all 
protons are qualitatively the same, if some of my protons are swapped with others what 
difference does this make? 
 
1.2.3. Is it necessary for a human to have the genes (considered as blueprints) that they 
actually have? 
 
What about thinking of genes as sets of instructions – as abstract objects? Such a view has its 
attractions. It implies, as seems right, that if part of my genetic code was replaced by a 
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physically different but functionally identical part, then this would not make any difference to 
my identity. 
 
However, thinking of genes as “blueprints” may be wrongheaded. Over the last few decades 
the importance of environmental influences on development has come to be emphasised, 
especially by advocates of Developmental Systems Theory (Griffiths and Gray 1994). 
Developmental Systems Theory holds that “the role of the genes is no more unique that the 
role of many other factors” (1994, p.277). Development can be shaped by the environment 
pre-birth (the food the mother eats, the bacteria she harbours etc.) and the environment post-
birth as much as it is shaped by genes. On such a view thinking of the genes as supplying the 
“instructions” for development makes no sense. 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that some parts of our genetic code are more important than others. It 
is controversial whether our junk DNA is really junk, or whether it serves some purpose. Still 
it is likely that some of our genetic make-up has no phenotypic effects. If we think of our 
genes as being important for our identity in so far as our genes affect our phenotype then we 
would presumably conclude that junk DNA does not matter. Once we go down this line 
problems emerge. If we ask why we are tempted to discount changes to junk DNA, the answer 
can only be that it makes no phenotypic difference. But, now it looks like the reason we think 
that standard DNA is of importance is parasitic on the importance we attach to the phenotypic 
traits we see it as coding. And, if it is the phenotypic effects that we are ultimately interested 
in, it looks like we could forget about the genetic make-up of an embryo, and say directly that 
what matters for transworld identity is phenotypic similarity.  But this is an option that no-one 
wishes to endorse, as we also have a strong intuition that organisms might have come to be 
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born looking rather differently from the way they actually looked (if, for example, they came 





1.3 The Problem of Tolerance 
 
I have discussed prima facie problems with claiming that either the actual physical matter, or 
the genes considered as blueprints, are necessary for identity. The genetic essentialist might be 
able to get round these worries, and develop an account of the importance of genes that avoids 
conceiving of genes as merely abstract instructions. Still, however the view that genetic make-
up is necessary is developed, I suggest that it will be unable to accommodate the Problem of 
Tolerance. The difficulty is that we should plausibly be tolerant of slight changes in origins. It 
is tempting to think that very small changes to origins – a different atom, or a different DNA 
allele - shouldn’t matter. However as soon as we allow for some tolerance we run into 
difficulties when we consider what happens across possible worlds. As we move from world 
to world, making some changes to my genetic make-up as we go, small changes gradually add 
up to big changes. Cooper in possible world B may be genetically very similar to Cooper in 
possible world A, and Cooper in world C is similar to Cooper in B, and yet the Cooper in 
worlds A and C are unalike. If we tolerate small changes we will want to say that the Coopers 
in worlds A and B are identical, and that the Coopers in worlds B and C are identical. 
However, given that identity is a transitive relation, we cannot say this without also claiming 
that the Coopers in worlds A and C are identical – and this is not something we want to admit.  
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Stalnaker considers the analogous case for artefacts, and the options that we have for 
resolving the problem.  
 
...consider a sequence of possible worlds, each containing a bicycle that differs 
slightly in its composition from the bicycle in the preceding world, but such that the 
bicycle in the first world in the sequence has no parts in common with the bicycle in 
the last world. Identity, of course, is transitive. One cannot say that each bicycle is 
identical to the bicycles in the neighbouring worlds, but not to the corresponding 
bicycles in distant worlds. The argument suggests that one must either adopt an 
extreme form of mereological essentialism, requiring identity of all parts for identity 
of the whole, or else give up the standard account of identity across possible worlds. 
(Stalnaker, 1986, p.125) 
 
There are two ways in which one might give up on the “standard account of identity across 
possible worlds”. The first option is to claim that the accessibility relations between possible 
worlds are non-transitive: although possible world B is accessible from A, and possible world 
C is accessible from B, possible world C need not be accessible from A. This is a radical 
option, and though it has some advocates (Salmon, 1986), many think it is too high a price to 
pay (Coburn, 1986, pp.172-4). The other way to give up on the “standard account of identity 
across possible worlds” is to abandon all talk of transworld identity and to embrace 
counterpart theory instead. This is the option that will be explored in Section 2 of this paper. 
A third option, not considered by Stalnaker, is that one might construe his problem as a 
standard sorites paradox and deal with it via whatever method one employs in dealing with 
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other sorites cases. To take this option, however, one needs to think that there is some solution 
to sorites cases. In any event, tolerance leads to a variety of other paradoxes of transworld 
identity that cannot be seen as sorites cases (Mackie, 2006, pp.59-64). 
 
At the end of this section I hope to have demonstrated that essentialism for organisms is not a 
tenable position. There are, of course, varieties of individual essentialism other than origin 
essentialism. Some believe that an individual’s immaterial soul is essential. For those who 
don’t believe in souls, the problem is that apart from some property connected to the origins 
of an individual there appear to be no viable candidates for individual essences. While a 
property such as an individual’s spatial location at some particular time would be suitably 
unique, it doesn’t intuitively seem “important enough” to be essential.   
 
Not all essentialists believe in individual essences. The sortal essentialist claims that although 
there are no individual essences there are kind essences, such that it is not possible for an 
individual to belong to a different kind than it actually belongs to (e.g. Wiggins 2001). Sortal 
essentialists can be surprisingly reticent in stating exactly what sortals they are committed to, 
but if biological species are taken to be sortals, then on such a position there is no possible 
world in which a human is a slug. If higher-level sortals, e.g. organism versus artefact, are 
considered fundamental, then at least there is no possible world in which a human being is a 
slab of concrete. As propounded by Wiggins, sortal essentialism is developed within a neo-
Aristotelian framework. The basic idea is that there are natural kinds, such that members of a 
natural kind have different natural life cycles, and these life cycles inform principles of 
identity and differentiation for members of a kind. A tadpole, for example, is the sort of 
creature that develops into a frog. For this reason we take the tadpole and the frog to be the 
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same individual. In contrast, it is not natural for a human to transform into a fly, and we would 
thus be likely to consider any human-to-fly process to have destroyed the human. 
 
 It is worth noting that the sorts of question about counterfactual possibilities for individuals 
that are of greatest practical import are precisely those where an Aristotelian sortal 
essentialism can be of least assistance. Questions about how I might have been are of most 
practical interest where they concern questions about whether a human might have been a 
different type of human (e.g. without genetic disease, of a different race, or sex), but the idea 
that there are different natural kinds of human being is implausible. In particular, the notion 
that races, or sexes possess essential properties is empirically unlikely (on race see Glasgow 
2003, on sex see Dupré 1993 ch.3). Interesting practical questions also arise when we consider 
the counterfactual possibilities for organisms that are shaped by genetic technologies – but 
here again Aristotelian talk of natural life-cycles will be of little help, as these organisms 
precisely don’t have natural life cycles.  In any case, sortal essentialism cannot respond to 
Chisholm’s Noah-Adam paradox, and here I will not consider it further. 
 
In this section I have argued that origin essentialism should be eliminated as an option for 
thinking about counterfactual possibilities for individuals. This leaves us with no reason for 
thinking that individuals possess necessary properties that will stop them swapping properties 
with other individuals in other possible worlds. In responding to Chisholm’s Noah-Adam 
paradox, we are thus left to choose between adopting counterpart theory or believing in “bare 
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identities”. Either option will be repulsive to many.6 Here I will not adjudicate between the 
approaches, but will rather consider first what one should say about counterfactual 
possibilities for individuals if one is a counterpart theorist, and second what one should say if 
one believes in bare identities. In considering counterpart theory I will also show how links 
can be made with the volitional account of identity developed by Harry Frankfurt. This 




2. Counterpart Theory 
 
Counterpart theorists claim that individuals are worldbound. That is, we who exist in the 
actual world exist in no other possible worlds. Thus, for the counterpart theorist, strictly 
speaking, talk of transworld identity makes no sense.  
 
According to counterpart theorists, when I make a counterfactual claim, say, that I might have 
been born with blond hair, this means that there are possible worlds that contain my blond-
haired counterparts.  My counterparts are not identical with me – they are not mes in other 
possible worlds. Rather, my counterparts are possible individuals who are more or less like me 
and act as a comparison class for making sense of counterfactual statements.  
 
                                                 
6
 The literature on counterpart theory is vast, but for some criticism of counterpart theory see 
Mackie 2006 ch.5; Merricks 2003, Fara & Williamson 2005. For concerns about bare 
identities see Forbes 1985, pp127-8. 
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How do we identify our counterparts? My counterpart in another possible world is the person 
most similar to me in important respects.
7
 As it is a similarity relation rather than an identity 
relation, the counterpart relation is not transitive (Lewis 1979, p113). My counterparts must be 
similar to me – but the extent and aspect in which they must be similar differs with context 
(Lewis, 1979, p.128). Depending on the context, we might take our counterparts to be those 
possible people who have origins that are most like ours, or who look most like us, or 
whatever. Counterpart theorists are happy to employ their theory to make sense of a weak 
form of essentialism. Lewis tells us that “an essential attribute of something is an attribute it 
shares with all of its counterparts” (Lewis 1979, p.120). However, one should note that given 
that we choose which attributes we consider important for determining someone's 
counterparts, we also, indirectly choose which attributes we will consider essential. For 
example, suppose that within some context I privilege genetic similarity. Then I will only 
consider possible people who are genetically identical to me to be my counterparts, and I will 
conclude that my genotype is essential to me. In another context, the results might be 
different. Suppose I instead focus on phenotypic similarity, then I will count some possible 
people who look like me but are genetically different as my counterparts, and in that context 
my genotype would not appear essential. If, as Lewis suggests, all of my counterparts are 
human, and thus I am essentially human, this is only because there is no context in which I am 
prepared to count a non-human as similar enough to me to be my counterpart. For the 
counterpart theorist, who counts as my counterparts, and which of my attributes are essential, 
depends on the context in which I am speaking and the choices that I make. 
                                                 
7
 Sometimes two possible people in another possible world may be equally similar to me and 
both be my counterparts. (Lewis 1979, p113). One advantage of talking in terms of 
counterparts instead of in terms of transworld identity is that one can make sense of 
statements like “I might have been a twin” 
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2.1 Counterparts and volitional accounts of identity 
 
Running parallel to metaphysical debates, moral philosophers have proposed “volitional” and 
“narrative” accounts of identity. Few links have been drawn between the two literatures, but I 
will suggest that useful interconnections can be drawn.  
 
2.1.1Frankfurt's volitional account of identity 
 
Harry Frankfurt has offered the best developed account of how one’s volitional structure 
might be important for identity. Frankfurt views humans as having many and varied desires, 
some of which they endorse and some of which they do not (Frankfurt, 1971). You may be 
addicted to nicotine, for example, but experience your desires for nicotine as being alien. You 
fight against them. These desires are external to you, according to Frankfurt, and they don't 
count towards making you who you are. You will typically also have desires that you do 
endorse. For example, you may want to look after your children, or to travel the world. These 
cares do count towards making you who you are. Although Frankfurt presents his account 
somewhat differently in different writings, the basic idea remains the same – second order 
volitions, or “cares”, are what matters for personal identity. 
 
According to Frankfurt our cares constrain the possible courses of action that are available to 
us. 
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A person may care so much...that he is subject to a kind of necessity. Because of this 
necessity, various courses of action that he would otherwise be able to pursue are 
effectively unavailable to him. It is impossible for him to pursue them...The reason is 
that he cannot bring himself to do so... (Frankfurt, 1999, p.111)   
 
One might have various worries about Frankfurt’s account (for criticism see, for example, 
Shoemaker 2003, Velleman 2002). Here I do not embrace a blanket version of 
Frankfurt’s position. Rather I will argue that we can use counterpart theory to see how it 





2.1.2.Frankfurt and counterparts 
 
On counterpart theory, one's counterparts vary with context. Depending on the specific issue, 
one compares one's actual self with a reference class of counterparts, who are similar to 
oneself in relevant ways, in order to determine how one might be different. One of the main 
contexts in which we consider counterfactual situations is when we are planning what to do. 
When we plan, we consider what the outcomes of various possible courses of action will be, 
and select the course of action that appears most likely to have good results. 
 
In planning, we generally place certain constraints on the possibilities that we consider. In 
particular, in any context, the things that we care most about preserving are normally held 
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constant. Let us compare two people, Loving Luke and Ambitious Alan. The most important 
thing in Loving Luke’s life is his girlfriend. The most important thing to Ambitious Alan's is 
his career. Apart from their deepest cares, Luke and Alan live identical lives. They both 
currently have nice jobs, and nice houses, and nice partners.  Both are faced with a decision, 
their girlfriends will be moving away for a couple of years to nurse a sick parent. Alan and 
Luke must decide whether to leave their jobs and move with their partners or to stay behind. 
When Loving Luke makes plans he does the following: he keeps his relationship with his 
girlfriend constant, and considers possible worlds in which the other elements of his life are 
different in order to seek out the best course of action. He thinks to himself, “I could get 
another job” or “Maybe I don't need to work for a couple of years”. However, worlds in which 
he abandons his girlfriend are not amongst the worlds he considers. For Luke, splitting up 
with his girlfriend does not feature as a possible option. Ambitious Alan's thinking is 
different. He keeps his career constant, and considers only the possibilities that are compatible 
with career success. He considers worlds in which he sees his girlfriend at weekends, or splits 
with her and either gets another girlfriend, or is single. For each person, the possible worlds 
that they consider when planning are limited to those that are compatible with what they love 
most. 
 
I must concede that our cares do not always constrain our planning. Sometimes we do not 
know our cares prior to acting, but rather, via acting and then feeling an emotional response, 
come too late to discover what we care about. A classic example is the teenager who deserts 
their boyfriend, or girlfriend, and then, through feeling upset at the split, discovers only too 
late that they were in love. I accept that such cases occur, and indeed that they are common 
enough that they are better considered to be indicative of the usual frailty and stupidity of 
 21  
human beings rather than being in any way pathological. This being said, I hold that there are 
enough cases where we do know our cares and use them to constrain our plans for the 
relationship between cares, plans and action that I have outlined above to be both usual and 
normative. 
 
We can make sense of such planning in terms of counterpart theory. When we plan we 
normally consider only those possible worlds that are compatible with valuing the things we 
care about most. Thus, when we think about what we could do, the relevant counterparts are 
those that live in this set of possible worlds.  In these worlds, Loving Luke has no counterpart 
who splits with his girlfriend. Frankfurt talks of “volitional necessities” - choices that we are 
compelled to make if we are to stay true to what we care about the most. Following his lead, 
we might also talk of the volitionally possible - where something is volitionally possible if it 
occurs in a possible world that is consistent with a person's deepest cares. It is not volitionally 
possible for Luke to abandon his girlfriend. While the terminology here may be new, the basic 
idea is not. Consider the phrase “X couldn't hurt a fly”. It's never the case that a human is 
logically incapable of harming a fly, and seldom if ever the case that they are physically 
incapable of doing so. Rather, the phrase turns on the idea that some people are so opposed to 
violence that they would not be able to bring themselves to destroy a living creature. The 
basic idea – that a “would not” can be considered as a variety of “could not” is the same as 
that captured by talk of volitional necessities and possibilities.  
 
Frankfurt himself does not talk in terms of possible worlds or counterparts, but my version of 
his account fits well with his own claims. Frankfurt compares volitional necessity with logical 
necessity. He says that in a way analogous to the way in which we cannot conceive of a 
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logical contradiction  “There are certain things that people cannot do, despite possessing the 
relevant natural capacities or skills, because they cannot muster the will to do them” (2004, 
p.46). He goes on to tell us that, “The necessities of a person's will guide and limit his agency. 
They determine what he may be willing to do, what he cannot help doing, and what he cannot 
bring himself to do” (2004, p.50).  
 
While Frankfurt talks of one's cares as being essential to one's identity, counterpart theorists 
do not think that talk of transworld identity strictly makes sense. Still, Lewis allows that “we 
might say, speaking casually, that your counterparts are you in other worlds, that they and you 
are the same” (1979, p.112). Furthermore, as discussed previously, when speaking loosely, for 
the counterpart theorist, an essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all of 
its counterparts. Thus, loosely speaking, the counterpart theorist will allow us to say that in 
certain contexts one's counterparts are those possible people that share our cares, and in this 
context, one's cares are essential to one's identity. Admittedly, in other contexts, we will 
choose to pick out counterparts differently, and the attributes that will be considered essential 
for our identity will correspondingly shift. However, it is worth emphasising that the context 
in which we take our cares to pick out our counterparts is not just one context amongst others. 
This set of counterparts has a particular significance because it is the set that is normally 
relevant for first-person planning.  
 
Thinking of cares as being central to identity in key contexts helps to make sense of some of 
the claims that are made by the advocates of identity-politics. If someone says that being gay, 
or being Deaf, is essential to their identity, I suggest that we cash this out as meaning that 
being gay (or being Deaf) is something that they care about a lot. When they plan, they thus 
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only think of possible gay (or Deaf) people as being their counterparts. From such a 
perspective being gay (or being Deaf) is essential to who they are. 
 
Thinking in terms of counterparts helps elucidate certain aspects of Frankfurt's account. Like 
counterparts, volitional necessities plausibly shift with context. In his work, Frankfurt uses the 
case of Luther as an example. Famously Luther found it impossible to betray his religious 
convictions -  “Here I stand, I can do no other”. Shoemaker points out that if the situation 
were slightly different, say a dearly loved daughter was threatened, then Luther would 
plausibly have viewed his options very differently (Shoemaker, 2003, p.107). Thinking in 
terms of counterpart theory can help us make sense of what is going on here. Our counterparts 
vary with context. In the situation in which Luther has no daughter then the possible people 
who are most like him in having the same cares (i.e. his relevant counterparts) do not betray 
his religious convictions. In the situation in which he has a daughter who he loves more than 
his religion, then his counterparts shift – now the possible people who are most like Luther are 
those who do not betray his daughter. 
 
Using counterpart theory to make sense of Frankfurt's claims also explains why it is that some 
of his statements concerning the implications of betraying what we care about seem both to 
be, in a sense, profoundly true, and yet, also in another sense, clearly false. On Frankfurt's 
account a person is destroyed when they betray their cares. But exactly what this might mean 
needs to be treated very carefully.  In his paper "Identification and Identity" (2002), Velleman 
stresses that it is a normal, although perhaps unfortunate, feature of human life that people can 
be fickle and that the things people care about very often do change. Frankfurt’s account 
seems to imply that being fickle can be fatal, which is clearly false.  
 24  
 
Again, counterpart theory can help. The individuals that count as one's counterparts vary with 
the context in question. From the first-person point of view our counterparts are often those 
possible people who share our cares. The fact that we often think about modal contexts when 
we are making plans means that this choice of counterparts often makes sense. Against such a 
reference class it is true that an individual could not betray the people that he or she loves – 
the individual has no counterparts that make the betrayal.   
 
On the other hand, the context from which a third party views and judges an individual is 
different.  When we judge another we generally do not know, or are not concerned about, their 
cares.  We thus do not use the criteria of similarity of cares when we pick out the person's 
counterparts. Rather we use some other criteria – maybe bodily or psychological continuity. 
From our point of view the individual has counterparts in all those worlds in which there is 
someone like them who has a particular set of memories, or body. From such a context, we 
can say that as there are worlds that contain that person's counterparts in which they exist but 
have betrayed what they love. 
 
At this point we can return to the scenarios with which I began this paper, and answer the 
questions of whether I might have been born prettier, or have been born a rhino. If we use 
counterpart theory neither of these questions has a straight answer. In different contexts we 
will pick out different possible entities as being my counterparts. In order to answer the 
question of whether I might have been prettier, we need to decide how we will pick out 
counterparts in the context in which we are speaking. Once we have done this, we can say that 
if some of my counterparts are prettier I might have been prettier. I suggest that, for the most 
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part, it will make sense to think that I might have been more attractive. In most contexts, we 
will pick out my counterparts on the basis of similarity of cares, or of origins, or of memories, 
or of physical similarity, and I will have prettier counterparts. Turning to the rhino scenario, 
thinking of any context in which we would consider a rhino to be one of my counterparts is 
harder. Possibly, if my memories were implanted into an adult rhino, there are contexts in 
which we would consider that rhino to be my counterpart. In the scenario with which I began, 
however, my genetic material is transformed into rhino genetic material prior to my birth. I 
cannot think of any relevant similarity relations between the possible resultant rhinos and my 
human self that would lead us to judge the rhinos to be amongst my counterparts. Thus, we 
can say that I could not have been transformed into a rhino prior to my birth. 
 
Some readers will find counterpart theory an unattractive option. At this point we should 
remember that in thinking about how an individual might have been we are forced to respond 
to Chisholm’s Noah-Adam paradox, and to take a view on whether there are possible worlds 
in which two actual individuals have exchanged all their properties. As outlined at the 
beginning of this paper there are three options: 1. claim that individuals have necessary 
properties (and use this to say that Noah and Adam cannot exchange properties), 2. embrace 
bare identities (and say that Noah and Adam can exchange properties), 3. embrace counterpart 
theory (and thus deny that talk of transworld identity strictly makes sense). I have argued that 
claiming that individuals possess necessary properties is problematic. Embracing counterpart 
theory or bare identities will both seem unattractive options to many, but with no other options 
in sight one must go for one or the other. In this section I have outlined what a counterpart 
theorist should say about the ways we might have been, in the next section I consider the 
stance of the believer in bare identities.  
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3. Bare Identities  
 
My discussion of the bare identity theorist will be brief as much of the discussion so far 
remains applicable. In How Things Might Have Been (2006), Penelope Mackie develops the 
view that individuals can have bare identities. Those who believe in bare identities hold that 
there is a possible world that differs from the actual world only in that two actual individuals 
have swapped all their properties (for example, Chisholm’s world in which Noah and Adam 
have swapped all properties). Mackie admits that claiming that there can be bare identities is 
an unattractive option. The reason that Mackie embraces bare identities is that she thinks that 
claiming that individuals possess necessary properties that will prevent swaps is untenable, 
and that counterpart theory is an even less attractive option. Accepting that there are bare 
identities is thus the only route left open to her in  responding to Chisholm’s paradox. 
 
Mackie thinks that there may be strictly speaking no limits to the alternative properties that an 
individual might possess.
 8
 This does not follow directly from her claim that there are bare 
identities, as someone might believe in bare identities and also be, say a sortal essentialist (but 
Mackie also has doubts about sortal essentialism).  If Mackie is right, and individuals might 
possess any properties at all, there will be possible worlds in which I am a rhino, or a 
                                                 
8
 Mackie limits her discussion to “normal individuals” such as “people, cats, trees and tables” 
(2006, p.vi). She doesn’t say what counts as “an individual” but presumably “individuals” 
are defined such that I couldn’t have been the set-theoretic union of Mondays and the back 
left leg of a cat. 
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centipede. This being said, in most contexts, these far-out possibilities will not be worthy of 
consideration. Although there are worlds in which I am a rhino they will be far distant worlds. 
 
Someone who accepts that there are strictly speaking no limits to the properties that I might 
possess can still hold that, as a matter of pragmatics, conversational context sets limits on the 
alternative possibilities that are worthy of consideration. If conversational context is used to 
set limits on the range of possible worlds that should be considered, then, if they wish, 
someone who thinks that individuals strictly speaking have no necessary properties will be 
able to talk loosely about “necessity”, “identity” and “essences” in the same sort of way that 
the counterpart theorist does (indeed Mackie make some suggestions along these lines). For 
example, in certain contexts the counterpart theorist will take sameness of origin to be the 
property that is of importance for determining counterparts, and that in this context they will 
say that sameness of origin is “essential” (loosely speaking). Someone who believes that 
individuals have no necessary properties can engage in the same sort of loose talk if they take 
pragmatic constraints to set limits on the range of possible worlds that should be considered. 
Via this sort of manoeuvre, the claims made in Section 2 (on counterpart theory) on the 
special status of those possible worlds in which our cares are kept constant can be translated 
into terms that should be acceptable to someone who thinks that there are, strictly speaking, 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have sought to address the question of how I might have been. I started by 
considering the claims of those who think that a human's origins are necessary. There are 
various ways in which this idea might be made precise but I argued that all are problematic.  
If we abandon the idea that individuals possess necessary properties, then our only options in 
responding to Chisholm's Noah-Adam paradox is to either embrace counterpart theory or to 
hold that individuals can have bare identities. I did not attempt to arbitrate between these 
options, but instead explored what each type of theorist should say about how I might have 
been. 
 
According to counterpart theory, individuals are strictly speaking worldbound. Counterfactual 
claims are made true by the facts concerning our counterparts – those possible people who are 
most similar to us in important respects. The “important respects” depend on the context in 
question. Counterpart theory allows us to talk of attributes that are “essential for our identity” 
in a loose sense – an attribute is essential for our identity if all our counterparts possess it. 
 
Using Frankfurt's volitional account of identity I have suggested that one very important 
similarity relation that we use to pick out counterparts is similarity in respect to cares. 
Planning what to do is one of the main contexts in which we make use of modal reasoning – 
in planning we compare possible courses of action. Given that we are unwilling to abandon 
the things we care about, when we plan, we only consider those courses of action that are 
compatible with our deepest cares. As such, from the position that we assume when we 
construct first-person plans, we have no counterparts who do not share our cares. Speaking 
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loosely, we can say that our cares are essential for our identity. This helps make sense of 
Frankfurt's account, and also of claims that are made by the advocates of identity-politics who 
claim that, say, being gay can be essential to someone's identity. Using counterpart theory we 
can see that there is an important context in which such claims are true. However, at the same 
time, there are also other contexts, in which they are false – there are contexts in which we 
pick out counterparts on grounds other than their cares. 
 
Finally, I argued that someone who believes in bare identities and thinks that individuals can 
have radically different properties in other possible worlds can consistently also hold that 
pragmatic constraints mean that in any particular conversational context only a limited range 
of possible worlds need to be considered relevant. Via using context to limit the range of 
worlds to be considered, the believer in bare identities can talk loosely about properties being 
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